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I
INTRODUCTION
A. The Recent Wave of Police Corruption
In the midst of a federal investigation that resulted in the conviction of
thirty-one Philadelphia police officers, the Philadelphia Inquirer, which referred
to the city as a "petri dish for corruption,"' described the elements that made
Philadelphia one of the leading examples of systemic police corruption in
recent years. A hierarchical and lucrative system of payoffs from pimps, video
gambling machine purveyors, and numbers operators cut through several
layers of the police force, extending as far as the second-in-command of the
entire city. 2 Through a series of federal investigations and prosecutorial
efforts that netted several high-ranking police officers, some of whom turned
state's evidence and broke what the chief prosecutor called the conspiracy of
silence, the Philadelphia situation was brought to the forefront in a country
which had experienced several significant police scandals in recent years. As
the chief prosecutor explained, "[t]he message has been sent that officers
cannot trust anyone to insulate them from the consequences of their
wrongdoing.'"
In other major American cities, corruption episodes were also coming to
the attention of authorities. In New York City, several members of the 77th
Precinct were indicted after they were suspected of extorting money from
crack dealers. 4 In Boston, officers were convicted of activities including
extorting payoffs from vice purveyors. 5 In San Francisco, an initiation
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ceremony for a rookie police officer that included the services of a prostitute
was among several key events that forced that city to reexamine some of the
controls it maintained over its police force.6 In Miami, where the onslaught of
drug importation in the last decade has inexorably changed the nature of the
community to one reminiscent of the Wild West, a ringof police officers was
tried for running a drug distribution enterprise. 7
In many ways, the forms the examples noted above took were either
predictable or routine. For instance, while the Philadelphia example was
noteworthy for the extent of its operation and the success of the prosecutorial
team in gaining cooperation from insiders, 8 the extortion schemes themselves
were fairly traditional forms of shakedowns from that frequent victim, the
illegal gambler. Amidst the third wave of legalization of gambling in this
country, which saw the approval of casinos in one state,9 horse racing in
several states,' 0 and lotteries in many others,"! the meaning of the
Philadelphia example is difficult to discern. We are thrown back to the
insights of Gardiner, who found in Wincanton the apparent contradiction
among the residents there who were tolerant of illegal gambling, but alarmed
and disapproving toward the police corruption that ensued from the
implementation of such a policy of tolerance. 12
In Miami and New York City, the cocaine-related cases, coming at a time
when the country has devoted significant financial and emotional resources to
curtailing the flow of illicit drugs into the country, are of great import. '3 The
five cases, Philadelphia, New York City, Miami, Boston, and San Francisco,
taken together represent a sample of the types of police corruption issues
related to vice that have developed in the past decade. They have done so
against a backdrop of increased gambling legalization,' 4 increased use of
cocaine and debate over its decriminalization,' 5 a prostitute rights
movement,' 6 bitter debate over the abortion laws,1 7 discussion of
pornography and its effects, 18 and increased use of marijuana and heroin. 19
6. Interview with David Ambrose, San Francisco Police Department Public Affairs Officer (Apr.
27, 1987).
7. L.A. Times, Jan. 22, 1987, at 114, col. 1.
8. Klein, supra note 2, at 115.
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CASINOS (forthcoming, 1989).
10. Id.
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15. L. GRINSPOON &J. BAKALAR, COCAINE: A DRUG AND ITS SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1985).
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(1987) (unpublished manuscript).
17. K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
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Moreover, these examples have happened at the same time as a number of
changes in the operation of police departments 20 and as interventions in
police departments taken to prevent and discover police corruption 2' have
been spawned.
For virtually the' entire existence of the urban American police force,
situations involving vice and its control have presented opportunitfdr
corruption and posed a challenge to police administrators who hoped to limit
their officers' misconduct without alienating the officers' loyalties. 22 Vice
creates many police problems, not only those which are corruption related.
Resource allocation is naturally complicated by the need to respond to
disorderly situations or other complaints. 23 Misconduct as serious as perjury
can be undertaken in vice circumstances to circumvent procedural due
process in situations which are otherwise serving organizational goals. 24 Vice
control combines the often critical mandate for order maintenance functions
of policing with the low seriousness assigned most vice offenses. 25 That sort
of conflict is rarely found in other activities. Police, like other bureaucratic
actors, are naturally concerned with achievement of their performance
criteria. The clearance rate of vice arrests (the percentage of successful
prosecutions or arrests) is too small either to please administrators or to
assuage the concerns of a public threatened by the perception of high and
increasing crime rates.
The ambivalence of vice control, a confusion created by the contradictory
messages American citizens send to their police, has created several persistent
moral, legal, and organizational dilemmas for American police departments. 26
If the police were to pursue policies of total enforcement, the work could
consume the available resources of police agencies, preventing them from
devoting even minimal effort to the policing of more serious crimes and the
processing of mundane citizen complaints. Moreover, as Gardiner and others
have shown, while corruption and vice feed from each other, Americans have
shown a strong dislike for the one while tolerating the other. 27 At a time
when vice is perceived as rising, and when the expense of both traditional and
innovative policing strategies is significant, especially in fiscally strained, vice-
impacted urban centers, new events and situations have amplified these
20. J. SKOLNICK & D. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: POLICE INNOVATION IN Six AMERICAN CITIES
(1986).
21. See generally A. KORNBLUM, THE MORAL HAZARDS: POLICE STRATEGY FOR HONEST AND
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR (1976); M. PUNCH, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF POLICE
DEVIANCE AND CONTROL (1985); L. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND REFORM: CONTROLLING POLICE
CORRUPTION (1978).
22. Skolnick, Police: Vice Squad, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1148, 1151-53 (S.
Kadish ed. 1983).
23. SeeJ. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 83-139 (1968).
24. M. PUNCH, supra note 21, at 13-14.
25. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 4,
5 (1984).
26. Skolnick, The Social Transformation of Vice, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1988, at 9.
27. J. GARDINER, supra note 12, at 55-56.
Page 201: Winter 19881
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
concerns, created complicated dilemmas, and generally added to the
complexity of vice control.
Studies analyzing the role of corruption in effecting organizational reform
indicate that, despite the substantial attention which scandals attract, the
conditions and costs of reforming corrupt police departments for any
rnidnifigful length of time are so great that the mere fact of scandal is not
enough to ensure subsequent reform.2 8 Nonetheless, the lull in Ameican
police corruption after the well-publicized Knapp Commission report 29 and
the Special Investigations Division scandal30 seemed to represent the
resolution of endemic problems associated with vice and police corruption.
Coming at the end point of this lull, however, the series of scandals in five
major American police departments called into question the effectiveness of
existing internal organizational controls as well as external monitoring
processes. Despite commitment of extensive federal law enforcement
resources and the "moral equivalent of war" applied to the control of illicit
drugs, the persistence of vice presented continued opportunities for
wrongdoing. 3' Moreover, the form and opportunities for corruption shifted.
Nine years ago, the trend toward legalization of vice appeared as though it
would have a profound effect on society, and scholars suggested a variety of
rationales and a number of models for legal regulation and control of various
forms of vice. 32 In the intervening years, however, a great impact on society
and the legal system by vice-related, issues has occurred, but arguably more in
the nature of confounding and contradictory effects. Marijuana causes little
concern, but government agencies reward agents for building marijuana
cases.33 Heroin is considered serious, and efforts to control street-level
dealing seem to have an effect on the heroin market. 34 Prostitution is usually
assigned low priority for policing, but the disorderly aspects of it sometimes
make for public uproar. Legal gambling has grown dramatically over the past
decade, yet other forms of gambling are resisted, due to possible problems. 35
Nowhere is this combination of mixed messages and mixed results of more
28. L. SHERMAN, supra note 21, at 242-63.
29. THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION (1973).
30. M. PUNCH, supra note 21, at 25-27.
31. See generally Reuter, Quantity Illusions and Paradoxes of Drug Interdiction: Federal Intervention into
Vice Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1988, at 233; M. Kleiman, Drug Enforcement and
Organized Crime: Current Knowledge and Research Prospects (1985) (unpublished manuscript
prepared for symposium sponsored by Northwest Policy Studies Center, Dulles International
Airport, Virginia, Sept. 25-26, 1986); Kleiman & Reuter, Risks and Prices: An Economic Analyis of Drug
Enforcement, 7 CRIME &JusT. 289 (1986).
32. See, e.g., J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA: THE NEW PROHIBITION (1970); J. SKOLNICK, HOUSE OF
CARDS: THE LEGALIZATION AND CONTROL OF CASINO GAMBLING (1978); Skolnick & Dombrink, The
Legalization of Deviance, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 193, 198-206 (1978).
33. M. Kleiman, Allocating Federal Drug Enforcement Resources: The Case of Marijuana 179
(1985) (unpublished doctoral dissertation,John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univ.).
34. J. KAPILAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 79, 83 (1983); see also Street-Level
Drug Enforcement (National Institute of Justice video crime film series 1986).
35. J. Dombrink & W. Thompson, Riding the Crest of the Third Wave: Illegal and Legal
Gambling Policies in America (1985) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the President's
Commission on Organized Crime).
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significance than in the ability of police departments to effectively deploy
strategies of corruption control at the same time as they pursue crime-fighting
techniques. In fact, some of the reforms aimed at deterring police corruption,
such as rotating police in their precinct assignments, are directly at odds with
some of the premises of the resurgence of community-based policing norms.
How the events of the last decade and the policing challenges of the next
decade have been affected by vice development will be examined below.
B. The Changing Patterns of Vice
During the 1960's, many prominent legal scholars argued against the
wasteful use of the crime-fighting resources in enforcing virtually
unenforceable laws in the area of vice. 36 From Packer's admonition to guard
against exceeding the limits of the criminal sanction 37 to Kadish's 38 and
Allen's 39 discussion of the unique properties of enforcement at the fringes of
the criminal law, various legal scholars rallied against the use of the criminal
sanction to legislate morality. Some followed Mill's notion that state
intervention in such areas was not compelled, 40 while others, such as Packer 4'
and Skolnick, 42 espoused the view that the impracticality of such laws was of
paramount concern.
Cocaine's passage from a rarely used, elitist, and little understood drug in
the early 1970's to a more widely used substance by 1988 has brought to the
foreground many complex and contradictory factors. As late as 1985,
Americans responding to an American Broadcasting Company ("ABC") poll,
overwhelmingly (92 percent to 6 percent) rejected the notion of making
possession of small amounts of cocaine for personal use legal. 4 3 Yet, cocaine
use was the fastest growing illegal drug use during this period.44 One has to
go back ten years to find a time when fewer Americans favored either
legalizing the use of marijuana or removing criminal sanctions on its
possession. 45 At the same time, six or seven respondents to the ABC poll
thought that "[d]rug abuse will never be stopped because a large number of
36. See infra notes 37-39.
37. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 250 (1968).
38. Kadish, The Crisis of Ovecriminalzation, 374 ANNALS 157, 164-65 (1967).
39. F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 7-9
(1964).
40. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 100 (C. Shields ed. 11th printing 1956) (1st ed. 1859).
41. H. PACKER, supra note 37, at 261-69.
42. Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 588, 632 (1966).
43. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, May 1985.
44. J. POLICh, P. ELLICKSON, P. REUTER &J. KAHAN, STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING ADOLESCENT
DRUG USE 33 (1984). The misidentification of cocaine as a narcotic and its identification as a
dangerous drug has persisted from the early twentieth century, even though widespread use might
somewhat mollify this notion. L. GRINSPOON & J. BAKALAR, supra note 15, at 211-237. The
emergence of crack as a more volatile concoction of cocaine reinforced this idea in the mid-1980's.
Kerr, Use of Crack: The Future, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1986, at 25, col. 5. Moreover, cocaine is
considered more a recreational drug than one likely for medicalization. L. GRINSPOON &J. BAKALAR,
supra note 15, at 238-67.
45. The Gallup Poll, June 20, 1985.
Page 201: Winter 1988]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Americans will continue to want drugs and be willing to pay lots of money for
them. "46
The generational patterns of familiarity and use, and the inability of
Americans to decide whether cocaine is in fact a soft or hard drug, have
created a stratified response to policy issues in this area.47 While the polls
cited above may indicate otherwise, the perception of cocaine has been
increasingly separated from the stigma attached to heroin. Naturally, some of
the disreputability of a drug is a result of the status of the average user.
Cocaine has long been billed as an affluent drug,4 8 a feature which has gained
it some positive status but also provides an obstacle against widespread social
acceptance. In any case, its use more closely parallels that of marijuana,
rather than heroin, and thus it has avoided some of the traps associated with
the latter.
At the same time as patterns of drug perceptions were changing, the
number of legal abortions grew annually, and even conservative groups were
in favor of the liberalized abortion laws established by Roe v. Wade.4 9 Gay-
rights groups had been successful in advancing the passage of more than fifty
state, county, and local ordinances prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. 50 In addition, gay and lesbian activists in several large
American cities had become articulate political actors and effective political
constituencies. 5' At the same time, the growth in legal gambling has taken
place against a curious situation regarding illegal gambling prevention. The
federation of gambling control5 2 in the 1970's reduced many of the
temptations related to local responsibility for policing, but has not reduced
police perception of links between illegal gambling and organized crime. 53
Vice has become at once more politicized, more subsumed under
expectations of civil rights, more commercialized, more available to ordinary
Americans, and essentially more ambivalent over the past decade.
In Skolnick's words, ever present public ambivalence has been
reinforced. 54 Measures to reduce or control police corruption are needed for
many reasons. For one thing, the reaction of citizens to police and their
performance and legitimacy may be predicated upon their perceptions of
police corruption. To the extent that citizens, particularly in high-crime, vice-
46. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, supra note 43.
47. L. GRINSPOON &J. BAKALAR, supra note 15, at 211-37.
48. Id. at 58-63.
49. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. Meeker, Dombrink & Geis, State Law and Local Ordinances in California Barring Discrimination on
the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745, 756 (1985).
51. D. ALTMAN, THE HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA: THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE
HOMOSEXUAL 109-45 (1982).
52. P. REUTER, DISORGANIZED CRIME: THE ECONOMICS OF THE VISIBLE HAND 177-81 (1983).
53. Pratter & Fowler, Police Perceptions about Gambling Enforcement. A National Survey of Law
Enforcement Agencies, in GAMBLING IN AMERICA, at 461, 464, app. 1 (1976) (Report of the Commission
on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling); J. MEEKER & J. DOMBRINK, BOOKIES AND
BOSSES: ILLEGAL GAMBLING AND LEGALIZATION EFFORTS 86 (1988) (proceedings of the Seventh
International Conference on Gambling and Risk-Taking).
54. Skolnick, supra note 26, at 12.
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impacted areas, think less of their police force, civic cooperation might be
reduced on more serious investigations. This conundrum will be examined in
the five case studies below.
II
MIAMI
"Miami Vice" may be a stylized and sensationalized television show, but
the scenes portrayed have their basis in the reality of the past decade's drug
wars. While the police in "Miami Vice" are generally noble and full of
integrity, the reality in Miami has often been otherwise. In numerous
examples, federal, state, and local law enforcement officers have fallen prey to
the lure of drug-related payoffs. 55 The temptations are ever present and
sizeable. As one high-ranking police officer observed, "[i]t's not unusual for a
police officer to stop a car in a routine traffic violation and find $20,000 in
cash."-56 The price of a kilogram of cocaine is almost the same as a Miami
police officer's annual salary. 57
As "Miami Vice," numerous news shows, and a spate of new journalistic
accounts have emphasized in recent years, Miami has become the illicit drug
capital of the United States. 58 The responsibility of policing such an area has
fallen primarily on the shoulders of federal interagency task forces, but has
also extended over to the local police forces in the South Florida region. In
the last decade, a number of law enforcement officers at all levels have been
convicted of misconduct related to the drug business.59 According to one
report, 100 of the 1060 Miami police officers have been, or are currently
being, investigated on corruption-related matters, and officials are predicting
that as many as 200 officers may face investigation.60
In Miami, the indictment of seven officers, known as the River Cops or the
Enterprise, revealed that they had started by stealing drugs from motorists
stopped for traffic violations and worked their way up to major rip-offs. 6 1
Informants would reveal the location of million-dollar loads of cocaine, and
the police officers would steal the drugs instead of arresting the dealers. 62
They were indicted, but the jury deadlocked in their first trial. After that, a
new series of indictments has targeted twenty officers, including the first
55. Stanford, Drugs and the Law, 470 ROLLING STONE 64 (Mar. 27, 1986).
56. Nordheimer, Police Corruption Plaguing Florida, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1986, at 19, col. 1.
57. Peterson, Miami Virtue, or Vice?, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
58. Rothchild, Crime Stoppers Notebook, 470 ROLLING STONE 61 (Mar. 27, 1986).
59. Volsky, Wide Miami Inquiry into Police Is Seen, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1987, at 29, col. 1.
According to the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Leon Kellner, "the Miami Police
Department has an extraordinarily serious problem, equal or surpassing anything I've seen
anywhere. Unfortunately, our probe is mushrooming and we could end up with the largest police
corruption case in United States' history." Id.
60. Id.
61. Bearak, Miami Seeking Answers and Police Trial Unfolds, L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1986, at 4, col. i.
62. Id.
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group of defendants. 63 Six of the twenty were fugitives from justice in August
1987.
The Miami River Police Case is presumably not the end of the corruption
probe, nor the only instance of finding police gone bad. Recently, in Miami,
an FBI agent pled guilty to accepting cocaine kickbacks, 64 and three Miami
p6 1ice officers were each charged with three counts of first-degree murder for
their roles in a drug execution.65 Authorities have yet to catch the person(s)
who stole $150,000 from the safe at the headquarters office of the Miami
police vice squad, as well as the thief of a quarter of a ton of marijuana from a
supposedly secure place in the Miami Police Department Compound. 66 In
February 1986, a police officer in nearby North Bay Village was arrested for
allegedly selling protection to FBI agents posing as drug dealers. 67
To fight the corruption in South Florida, an FBI corruption squad has
been in operation for several years. Federal initiative in this matter follows a
series of failed state investigations into Miami area police corruption. 68 One
group is working on corruption in local zoning processes, including one case
where an officer is accused of racketeering, bribery, and conspiracy to
murder. 69 In all, twenty-six agents are assigned to corruption. Several are
Spanish-speaking agents who have worked on police corruption cases in other
cities. Across town, IRS agents are tracking the assets of suspect police
officers and filling in the financial gaps of suspects in a variety of corruption
investigations. 70 Another group of federal agents is investigating prominent
Miami businessmen suspected of corrupting police with gifts and money.7 1 A
swelling intelligence base is adding to the driving force of these
investigations. When the corruption unit began in 1983, very little
information was available on the web of relationships that facilitate corruption
in Dade County; the body of knowledge about how things work in Miami has
grown significantly. The FBI and other agencies are thus able to target entire
networks of corruption. A team of agents and prosecutors can react
effectively to the informant or witness who comes forward with a story about a
bribe paid for a zoning decision or a shakedown by a crooked cop.
Some of the issues generated by the Miami scandal have been the
influence of youthfulness among police officers and attempts to achieve racial
diversity in the police force amid rapid expansion. At the same time, the
Miami Police Department was described as "overwhelmingly young and
63. Volsky, supra note 59.
64. Stanford, supra note 55, at 66.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. McGee & Leen, Feds Assault High-Level Corruption in S. Florida, Miami Herald, Nov. 16, 1986,
at I A, col. 1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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inexperienced. ' 72 Moreover, the police force had grown from 650 officers in
1980 to 1033 officers in 1985. One reason for the growth was the heavy influx
of Cuban refugees to Miami in 1980, the year of the Mariel boatlift from
Cuba. That event led to the resettlement of 100,000 Cubans, many with
criminal records or'other antisocial histories. 73 Promoted by the Liberty City
uprising of the early 1980's, among other influences, Miami police began to
rapidly absorb many new recruits from minority groups. 74 Later, when the
River Police Scandal unfolded, and all the suspects were either black or latino,
one police administrator noted, "[a] lot of people resistant to affirmative
action are using the arrests of Hispanic officers as a subterfuge ... [to attack
minority hiring programs.]" 75
The Miami River Police case will probably come to trial again in 1989.
Temptations related to the enormous drug traffic remain, and the unique
demands of policing a biracial city continue to pose challenges for the coming
decade. 76 How the Miami police rebound from the River Police case will
depend on larger efforts of drug interdiction, and site-specific issues of
recruiting from and policing a culturally diverse community.
III
PHILADELPHIA
The unprecedented federal prosecutions of systemic corruption in the
Philadelphia Police Department, including convictions of more than thirty
officers, revealed a deep-rooted structure, primarily centered on gambling-
related misconduct, that reached as high as the second-in-command in the
police department. 77 Far from an isolated example, the Philadelphia cases
revealed sophisticated networks of corruption grafted on to the police
command structure itself. According to federal prosecutor Howard Klein,
who personally tried twenty-two of the convicted police officers, "I think we
proved the depth and prevalence of corruption at the department, and this led
the city to reexamine the department and begin an extensive reform to
prevent the recurrence of institutionalized corruption. 7 8 The creation of a
stronger anti-corruption mechanism was a recommendation of the Report of
the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force, 79 headed by Professor Gerald
72. Ingwerson, Miami Grapples with Allegations of Police Corruption, Christian Science Monitor, Jan.
13, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
73. See generally D. RIEFF, GOING TO MIAMI (1987); T. ALLMAN, MIAMI: CITY OF THE FUTURE
(1987).
74. Nordheimer, Miami Police Scandal Raising Questions on Minority Recruits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1986, at 10, col. 1.
75. Id. at col. 3.
76. D. RIEFF, supra note 73.
77. U.S. Government Sentencing Memorandum, U.S. v. Martin, No. 84-00106 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
21, 1984).
78. Interview with Howard Klein, former federal prosecutor, Philadelphia (Mar. 19, 1987).
79. PHILADELPHIA POLICE STUDY TASK FORCE, PHILADELPHIA AND ITS POLICE: TOWARD A NEW
PARTNERSHIP (1987).
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Caplan.80 The report, issued in March 1987, characterized the Philadelphia
Police Department as "unfocused, unmanaged, under-trained, under-
equipped and unaccountable.- 8 1 The report attributed the sorry state of the
Philadelphia Police Department to a combination of community neglect and
management failure. In a particularly trenchant summary; the Caplan report
cdilu'ded that, "[t]he dead hand of past traditions guides the department
rather than the challenge of the future. A history of favoritism, corruption
and brutality hangs over it."82
The public response to police corruption and performance generally, as
measured by a poll for the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force in 1986,83
indicated that the Task Force's assessment had to take into account a curious
and often contradictory approach by Philadelphia residents to their police.
Seventy percent of city residents responding to a poll taken for the
Philadelphia Police Study Task Force rated the Philadelphia police as doing a
good or excellent job overall. One apparent reason was that the force, the
largest force per capita of America's ten largest cities, responded to over three
million calls for service in 1985, an average of nearly two calls per resident.8 4
A majority of residents had a high regard for the police profession, but at the
same time felt that Philadelphia police were underenforcing some types of
laws, especially in the areas of drugs and prostitution. Fully 69 percent of the
respondents thought that the law on drugs is underenforced, 56 percent
thought laws on prostitution were so treated, and 49 percent considered
gambling laws underenforced.8 5 Eighty-one percent of residents describe
their police as being honest, but roughly half thought the police to be
discourteous.8 6 By far, the most striking results were related to how
Philadelphia residents felt their police were rated regarding illegal and
nonprofessional behavior. Almost half of the respondents felt that
Philadelphia police engaged in some form of illegal or unprofessional
behavior sometimes or often, including a remarkable 32 percent who believed
the police used illegal drugs on duty.8 7
One of the Philadelphia Police Department's significant attempts to
redress the corruption problems was to appoint Philadelphia-based United
States Secret Service official Kevin Tucker as the Philadelphia Police Chief in
January 1986. Part of Tucker's attraction lies in his status as an outsider.
Unlike many of his predecessors and other possible commissioner candidates,
Tucker had little personal or professional incentive to protect corruption
within the department, and he was not in debt to any of the ranks below him.
Tucker initiated a number of actions directed against corruption, some soon
80. Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
81. PHILADELPHIA POLICE STUDY TASK FORCE, supra note 79, at 16.
82. Id. at 17.
83. Id. at 16-17.
84. Id. at 21-23.
85. Id. at 168.
86. Id. at 169.
87. Id. at 170.
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after his appointment. He established review boards to depoliticize
promotions and transfers within the police department.8 8 He also shifted the
assignments of the top police commanders and reassigned hundreds of mid-
level commanders. 89 The new commissioner ordered the department to
begin a field associates program, using new recruits to report incidents of
police corruption they might witness, 90 Tucker also reestablished foot patrols
in neglected neighborhoods to restore the bond between communities and
police. 9' To reduce police abuse of citizens, Tucker issued guidelines for the
use of night sticks and ordered that the Internal Affairs Division ("IAD")
investigate all instances where a citizen is injured by police. 92 Tucker also
increased the budget for outside training by 400 percent. 93
The history of police corruption in Philadelphia can trace its dubious roots
back almost to the very beginning of the police department. 94 Ward leaders
exerted their corrupt influence on all the police districts in their areas, and the
mayor exercised his corrupting influence over the entire police force.95 The
police were pawns that the politicians tried to control and use to advance their
own interests. With the prevalence of corruption, official probes soon began.
The first inquiry into police misconduct was in 1928. A county grand jury
claimed that officers were taking as much as two million dollars a year to
protect vice.96 This grand jury found numerous officers, including detectives,
captains, and inspectors, "unfit" to serve. 97 Less than nine years later in
1937, another grand jury found that, not only had corruption not been
eliminated, but it had actually grown and become more systematic and
ingrained. 98 Vice had flourished between the grand jury investigations. 99
The grand jury concluded that corruption touched all aspects of the police
department.' 00 Corruption functioned in the internal dynamics of the force,
extending from promotions to transfers. Corruption was no longer confined
to the streets.
Compared with federal prosecutors, whose record of thirty-one
convictions in thirty-six federal district court cases between 1983 and 1986
was formidable, local prosecutors had fared less well historically with police
corruption cases in the Pennsylvania courts.' 0 ' In the 1950's, several
88. Hepp, Tucker Casts a New Image for Police, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 5, 1987, at BO1, col. 1.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. CITIZENS' CRIME COMMISSION OF DELAWARE VALLEY, VICE ENFORCEMENT AND CORRUPTION IN
THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 8 (1985).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Heidorn, A Tough Challenge Faces Tucker: Cleaning House, Inside Out, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct.
21, 1986, at B06, col. 1.
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indictments against police were quashed, and seven police officers tried for
accepting gambling bribes were acquitted. 0 2 In 1971, then Commissioner
Joseph O'Neill, Mayor Frank Rizzo, and District Attorney Arlen Spector
promoted the need for self-policing and blamed the current cases on the
actions of a few rotten apples.10 3 After the Philadelphia Inquirer published a
series of articles asserting that the Philadelphia police were accepting payoffs
to protect gambling operations, Pennsylvania Governor Milton Shapp
ordered an independent investigation of police corruption by the
Pennsylvania Crime Commission. 10 4  The Crime Commission report
concluded that the history of the Philadelphia Police Department revealed a
clear cut trend: Corruption was widespread and continuing, and the
department was unable or unwilling to control it.105 Although a special
prosecutor followed up on the report with the indictment of nine officers, only
three were convicted, and the case against the highest ranking senior officer in
the group was thrown out of court. 10 6 A later study by Watergate Counsel
Sam Dash attributed the special prosecutor's problem to the unwillingness of
the Philadelphia Police Commissioner to provide the special prosecutor with
police records or to suspend officers indicted by his grand jury. 0 7
The present investigation of police corruption which began in 1981 has
proven to be different than previous investigations. The scope of the
investigation has been wider, and convictions with strict sentences have been
the rule rather than the exception.' 0 8 The current investigation of the
Philadelphia Police Department began as a result of a complaint filed with the
FBI by Donald Hersing, the owner of a house of prostitution.10 9
By far, the predominant police corruption-related activity in Philadelphia
has been illegal gambling. Beginning in the late 1970's, l0 vending machine
companies began buying video poker machines and placing them in bars and
taverns in Philadelphia. A patron who played the games would win free
games by beating the programmed odds and would be paid off in cash for the
free games won, with the bar owner and the vendor splitting equally the
profits from the machine." ' 1
The illegal gambling use of the machines made the machines subject to seizure and
the bar owners or bartenders subject to arrest. The defendants and their co-
conspirators used the threat of arrest and seizure to extort money from the vendors.
At times, a machine was seized or bartender arrested to instigate contact with a vendor
and to emphasize the necessity of paying the police for protection. 112
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION, A DECADE OF ORGANIZED CRIME: 1980 REPORT at x-xi
(1980).
106. Heidorn, supra note 101.
107. Id.
108. Klein, supra note 2, at 114.
109. CITIZENS' CRIME COMMISSION OF DELAWARE VALLEY, supra note 94, at 14.
110. Klein, supra note 2, at 108.
111. Id. at 108.
112. See Government Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 77, at 4.
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This initial investigation of some vice officers led to a city-wide 'probe-, of
police taking payoffs to protect vice." m5 FBI wiretaps revealed the extent and
depth of police corruption in the department. 1 4 Vice officers, detectives, a
lieutenant, and an inspector all were implicated in this extortion scheme by
the FBI wiretaps. In previous investigations, officers were implicated by other
officers, but in this investigation, officers implicated themselves on tape
recordings.
As the Philadelphia federal prosecutors noted, the government's evidence
introduced at the trial of seven officers, including Deputy Commissioner
James Martin, established that the defendants used the Philadelphia Police
Department to conduct a pattern of racketeering activity, 1 5 as defined by the
federal RICO statute."t 6 Martin had been Inspector for the Northwest
Division, one of nine in the city, from July 1982 to November 1983. In
January 1984, he became Deputy Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police
Department. The evidence presented at his trial showed that upon becoming
Inspector of the Northwest Division, he received protection money for poker
machines and numbers operations from his vice lieutenants, receiving
$10,000 a month until he was promoted."17
In the midst of this secret investigation, newly elected Mayor Wilson
Goode appointed a new Police Commissioner, Gregor J. Sambor, Tucker's
predecessor. In one of his first major decisions, the new Commissioner
consolidated the functions of those officers enforcing vice laws into a new
Major Investigations Division." 8 Until his appointment, vice enforcement
operated on tiered levels of responsibility." 9 Uniformed patrol officers,
plainclothes police assigned to district captains and inspectors, and vice
officers all enforced vice laws.' 20 The reasoning behind the tiered levels of
responsibility was to make the results of payoffs unpredictable as well as
expensive.' 21 The costliness and unpredictability of payoffs would force
criminals to refuse to pay, and thus the police would enforce the laws.
Sambor made the commander of the Major Investigations Division directly
accountable to Deputy Commissioner Martin.122  Martin and his
coconspirators planned to use the unit to operate a city-wide, not just
113. Klein, supra note 2, at 111.
114. Id. at 114.
115. U.S. v. DePeri, 778 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1985).
116. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
117. Klein, supra note 2, at 112.
118. Hepp, Police Chief Shifts Supervision of Ethics Division, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 7, 1987, at
B06, col. 5.
119. CITIZENS' CRIME COMMISSION OF DELAWARE VALLEY, supra note 94, at 15.
120. Id. at 15. Police officers testifying at the trials of other officers told how easy it was to take
money. One officer described how the tiered level of enforcement was easily circumvented by
corrupt police so that they could accept payoffs. This officer said that in order to ensure protection,
all he had to do was get in touch with the "cronies in other divisions." Interview with Howard Klein,
supra note 78.
121. CITIZENS' CRIME COMMISSION OF DELAWARE VALLEY, supra note 94, at 16.
122. Id.
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division-wide or precinct-wide, extortion ring. 1 23 All vice operations would
pay the officers in their district, and the officers would then give Martin a
percentage of the money. t24 Before Martin could put his plan fully into
motion, the FBI identified most of the conspirators, and the grand jury started
to hand down indictments. 125 Thirty-one police officers and officials,
including Deputy Commissioner Martin, were convicted. 126 The significance
of the trials was not the news of police corruption. The news was that not just
lower ranking officers were indicted. 12 7 Four lieutenants, a captain, an
inspector, a Chief Inspector, and the Deputy Commissioner all were charged
with various crimes.' 28 The convictions of these men and the other officers
destroyed the "bad apple" explanation. 129 Corruption was shown to be far-
reaching and associated with all ranks.
In addition to the Philadelphia Task Force, the Citizens' Crime
Commission of Delaware Valley has also made several conclusions and
recommendations for the Philadelphia Police Department.13 0 One conclusion
they draw is that the higher ranks must be intolerant of corruption.' 3 '
Tucker's tenure has been a welcome event in this regard. The Commission
also suggests that the "rotten apple" theory of corruption has been
abandoned, to the extent that the theory only reinforces the code of silence
and acts against systematic reform of the police department. 3 2
The Philadelphia Police Department has implemented some of the
recommendations: requirements of full financial disclosure for all candidates
for command level promotions; limited tenure in specialized vice and
narcotics units; prosecution of all involved in corruption including officers,
officials, and citizens; lenient treatment of officers cooperating with official
investigations in regard to their own misconduct; arousal of public concern;
establishment of field associates; and, finally, establishment of proactive
instead of reactive probes of possible corruption. 133 The department is
working on implementing two other recommendations.' 3 4  The first
recommendation is the establishment of a system to reward technical
specialization independent of the promotion process.1 35 Often excellence in
123. Id. at 17.
124. Id.
125. See Interview with Howard Klein, supra note 78.
126. Lounsberry, Crime Fighter Regretfully Says Goodbye, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 17, 1987, at
BOI, col. 1.
127. Klein, supra note 2, at 111, 112.
128. Id. at 114.
129. CITIZENS' CRIME COMMISSION OF DELAWARE VALLEY, supra note 94, at 18.
130. Id. at 23-32.
131. Id. at 23. Interview with Ian Lennox, Executive Director, Citizens' Crime Commission of
Delaware Valley in Philadelphia (Mar. 19, 1987).
132. CITIZENS' CRIME COMMISSION OF DELAWARE VALLEY, supra note 94, at 18.
133. Interview by Angelo Duplantier, University of California-Irvine student, with Ian Lennox,
Executive Director, Citizens' Crime Commission of Delaware Valley (Jan. 21, 1987); Angelo
Duplantier, Too Much Brotherly Love in the Philadelphia Police Department (unpublished student
paper, Mar. 20, 1987) (Program in Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine).
134. Id.
135. CITIZENS' CRIME COMMISSION OF DELAWARE VALLEY, supra note 97, at 23.
[Vol. 5 1: No. I
VICE AND POLICE CORRUPTION
a particular field is rewarded by promotion. Many times these promotions
remove the officer from precisely the area where his or her expertise lies. The
second recommendation that is likely to be implemented is a plan to
distribute vice intelligence so that the Major Investigations Division, Ethics
Accountability Division, and/or Internal Affairs Division are all apprised of
the investigation. 3 6 Monitoring of vice operations is critical in reducing
police corruption. When officers know they are being watched, they are less
likely to misbehave.
The many recommendations of the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force,
which include drug testing, the institution of mechanisms to transform police
managers from narrow supervisors to more effective decisionmakers,
"civilianization," more community policing techniques, and enhanced
training, all are directed at institutional reforms which will make the police
more responsible for controlling and preventing corruption. I3 7
The efficacy (or lack thereof) of prosecution as a deterrence strategy was
highlighted by the argument of Philadelphia law enforcement officials who
indicated that real reform depended less on the prosecutions than on the
organizational changes Tucker had introduced and the commitment of his
eventual successors to maintain them.' 38 If political ties among city hall, the
police, the district attorney's office, and the courts reasserted themselves, less
aggressive prosecution of police might result.'3 9
The ability of the Philadelphia Police Department to institutionalize anti-
corruption sentiment and control capabilities will be tested after the initial
vigilance of the Tucker administration dies down. Whether this city, with its
checkered history of police malfeasance, will adopt new approaches will be a
major national test of the efficacy of police reform.
IV
NEW YORK CITY
With over 27,000 officers, New York City by far enjoys the largest police
department in the country, 140 charged with the protection of a diverse
population of over seven million.' 4 1 The task of policing New York City has
long been a demanding one, and the history of police corruption in New York
City has long roots, including periodic assessments of desired corruption
control mechanism. The early 1970's saw the revelations of Detective Frank
Serpico,' 42 the study by the Knapp Commission, 43 and the corruption
136. Id. at 28.
137. PHILADELPHIA POLICE STUDY TASK FORCE, supra note 79, at 153-63.
138. Interview with Gerald M. Caplan, Professor of Law, George Washington University Law
School (Mar. 17, 1987).
139. Interview with Howard Klein, supra note 78.
140. 1988 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 798 (41st ed. 1988).
141. Id. at 761.
142. P. MAAS, SERPICO (1973).
143. See KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29.
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episodes of the elite Special Investigation Unit detailed in The Prince of the
City. 144
With the exposure of some crack-related corruption events in the mid-
1980's,145 New York City was once again thrust into the spotlight, amid
acrimonious disputes between rank and file officers and the police
commissioner. The recent New York City police corruption problems took
place against the largest increase in serious crimes (5 percent) in five years,
including a 14 percent increase in murder from 1985 to 1986.146 In the
revelations to date, including trial testimony by one officer against another, 147
allegations of entrapment, 48 and the suicide of one implicated officer,' 49
evidence indicates that New York Police Department (NYPD) officers in a
remote precinct regularly stole or accepted drugs and money from marijuana
and crack dealers.' 50  After having been disciplined for a departmental
infraction, one implicated officer had been transferred to the "dead end"
precinct from the narcotics division a few years prior, thus exposing the
limitations of internal disciplinary action against police officers. 15
When New York Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward responded to the
scandal by ordering a rotation plan including 20 percent of all officers, the
Police Benevolent Association countered with a work slowdown among other
means and caused Ward to rescind the action.' 52 The largest percentage of
official complaints regarding police behavior received by the NYPD in 1985
(22 percent) concerned narcotics. 153 The 644 narcotics-related complaints
were 36 percent more than in 1984.15 4 "Two-thirds of the increase in
narcotics complaints between 1984 and 1985 involved allegations of drug use
by members of the service and alleged protection of drug dealers."' 155 In
1985, New York officers with less than five years of experience constituted 45
percent of the police force but were responsible for 89 percent of the drug
charges and 72 percent of the complaints received by the Civilian Complaint
Review Board (CCRB).' 56 Such overrepresentation, however, could be
explained by the fact that younger officers comprise 75 percent of the street
patrol force or that newer police officers are more frequently assigned to
front-line operations, such as lower Manhattan's "Operation Pressure
144. R. DALEY, PRINCE OF THE CITY 25-27 (1978).
145. Purdum, 12 from Brooklyn Precinct Arraigned on Broad Range of Charges, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,
1986, at 15, col. 2.
146. Purdum, Serious Crimes in New York City Rise 576, First Increase in 5 years, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20,
1987, at A1, col. 1.
147. Buder, Officer Tells Why He Decided to Inform on Others, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1987, at B8, col. 4.
148. Shipp, An Inquiry or a Trap?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, at 12, col. 1.
149. Purdum, Missing Indicted Officer Found Dead in Motel, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
150. M. McALARY, BUDDY Boys, supra note 4.
151. Officer in Graft Trial Called Naive by Lawyer, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1987, at A29, col. 3.
152. Purdum, Ward Says Slowdown by Officers Has Worsened and May be Illegal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1986, at AI, col. 3.
153. 2 NEW YORK CITY MAYOR'S ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON POLICE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL
POLICY 171 (1987) [hereinafter MAYOR'S ADVISORY REPORT].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 23.
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Point."' 57 Moreover, city police officers called drug use their primaiy
corruption problem in 1986.158 For the first time, the NYPD's annual
corruption assessment survey' 59 found growing concern among commanders
over the possibility of drug abuse by off-duty officers. Even the many
advances made by the NYPD as far as instituting mechanisms for-corruption
control were being questioned.' 60  More recent probes found that
management controls within the NYPD were inadequate for the early
identification and disposition of those individuals with a propensity toward
misconduct. 16 1
The police scandals paled alongside three major upperworld and
underworld crime prosecutions in the mid-1980's. The highest levels of the
borough party machinery were prosecuted for municipal corruption,
including payoffs in the city's parking violations bureau. 62 At the same time,
another unit of the federal prosecutor's office was focusing on insider trading
schemes on Wall Street, resulting in a flurry of criminal prosecutions and
fines. 16 3 By no means the least of the three scandals was the trial of leaders of
the five New York organized crime families in the celebrated "Commission
case."164
The Knapp Commission was created in the early 1970's by then Mayor
John Lindsay, as a result of the publicity generated by renegade detective
Frank Serpico.' 65 After failing to get any support or action from his superiors
in the department, Serpico went to the New York Times with a story outlining
police corruption. 66 The resulting publicity forced Lindsay to appoint
Whitman Knapp, a Wall Street attorney, to head an independent commission
to look into the matter. 67 After months of hearings, investigation, and
deliberation, the commission found institutionalized, widespread corruption
in the NYPD.16a They further determined that there was organized protection
of vice by the NYPD.i69 In fact, according to the report, the climate of the
department is inhospitable to attempts to uncover acts of corruption, and
protective of those who are corrupt.' 70
157. Id. at 24.
158. Id.
159. Kerr, Officers Facing Drug Charges Call 11 Others Cocaine Users, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1986, at B 1,
col. 4.
160. Purdum, Suspensions Stir Accountability Issue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1986, at B4, col. 4.
161. 1 MAYOR'S ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 153, at 7.
162. Sheron, U.S. Officials See Historic Effort to Combat Municipal Corruption, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30,
1986, at 1, col. 1.
163. Kilborn, U.S. Said to Issue Subpoenas Linked to Boesky Trading, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1986, at 1,
col. 1.
164. Lubasch, Mob's Ruling 'Commission'to Go on Trial in New York, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1986, at 51,
col. 1.
165. See KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29.
166. P. MAAS, supra note 142.
167. KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29.
168. Id. at 1.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id. at 5-7.
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- The Knapp Commission recommended that commanders must be held
accountable for their subordinates' actions, that commanders were to prepare
periodic reports on the key sites and situations that could breed corruption,
and that field officers of the internal affairs division were to be created at all
precincts, and were to be staffed by undercover informants in each
precinct.' 7 ' The police department in New York responded to the Knapp-era
scandal by taking several courses of action: decentralizing authority and
responsibility, reducing the autonomy of the detective branch, setting new
standards of accountability for senior officers, instigating proactive
investigatory procedures for police deviance, altering certain aspects of
enforcement, rotating personnel, and emphasizing integrity in training.?72
With those ideas in mind, Commissioner Patrick Murphy was appointed to
clean up the department. Murphy was a no-nonsense ex-NYPD officer who
was passionate in his hatred of corruption. 173 Murphy used the Knapp
findings as a battle cry to revamp the department completely. "There were
massive transfers of senior officers, rotation of policemen in sensitive areas,
and . . . [a severe reduction of] the autonomy of the detective branch."1 74 A
new policy of accountability and decentralization was instituted. Murphy told
180 commanders that he would hold each of them personally responsible for
any misconduct within the ranks at any level of command.175 Murphy
revamped the internal investigatory system, which up to that point seemed
"deliberately designed not to work,"' 176 by sponsoring proactive internal
affairs projects with "integrity tests on field associates."' 177 Unit commanders
were unaware of the identity of those field associates. 78 Murphy also
attempted to alter the "opportunity structure" for corruption by "virtually
ending enforcement of gambling and Sabbath laws, by providing policemen
with sufficient funds to pay informants, and by starting a campaign to arrest
those citizens offering bribes."'79 By using political, legal, and press support,
Murphy was successful in reducing the corruption problem to a very "minimal
level."' 80  Murphy's biggest contribution, however, possibly was his
development and deployment of those proactive means for the prevention of
corruption. Those programs marked a change in the focus of anti-corruption
efforts. Murphy tried to avoid corruption before it started, rather than waiting
for it to become a problem again. His success was commendable. In a
number of informal police interviews by the criminologist, Maurice Punch,
171. Id. at 16-34.
172. See M. PUNCH, supra note 21, at 27-28; see also B. GELB, VARNISHED BRASS: THE DECADE
AFTER SERPICO (1983).
173. See P. MURPHY & T. PLATE, COMMISSIONER 167 (1977).
174. M. PUNCH, supra note 21, at 27.
175. P. MURPHY & T. PLATE, supra note 173, at 239.
176. Id. at 217-54.
177. Id. at 237.
178. Id.
179. M. PUNCH, supra note 21, at 28; see also JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, THE KNAPP COMMISSION AND PATRICK MURPHY 182 (1977).
180. M. PUNCH, supra note 21, at 28.
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conducted in 1980 and 1981, members of the NYPD spoke of, the
"revolution" put into place by Murphy. 8 ' In his 1978 book, Scandal and
Reform, criminologist Lawrence Sherman wrote, "from all indicators the most
recent episode of scandal and reform in the NYPD has reduced police
corruption to a very minimal level."' 18 2 Four years later the New York Times
stated that "[t]he whole climate of the department has been reversed since
Knapp." 83
As early as 1973, however, just one year after the Knapp Commission
released its findings, a corruption profile conducted by the Intelligence
Section of the Internal Affairs Department found that while some traditional
forms of graft had diminished, other forms of corruption (such as theft from
suspects and impounded cars, and the use of prostitute services under the
threat of arrest) were on the increase in certain precincts. 84 Despite the gains
made by Commissioner Murphy, corruption in the NYPD was far from over.
In the years immediately after Knapp, lapses of resurgent corruptive
practices occurred in the NYPD. In addition to the Special Investigative
Division "Prince of the City" Scandal, 185 in 1981, 1983, and 1985, small
episodes of localized corruption (some related to bribes from club owners)
took place in selected precincts.186
In 1986, however, a major scandal in a Brooklyn precinct erupted which
embraced the police commissioner, the Police Benevolent Association (PBA),
and the Major's Office. Thirteen officers from the 77th Precinct in the
Bedford-Stuyvesant area were indicted on various charges including stealing
and selling drugs.' 8 7 The group of officers included some who had been
transferred to the 77th Precinct because they were disciplinary problems at
other locales. Some were eighteen-year veterans of the NYPD. 188 The major
source of temptation was from drug dealers, their cash revenues, and even
their illicit substances.' 8 9 The officers who were involved in the activities
offered many rationalizations for their acts: they were harassing drug dealers
and the criminal justice system would not do anything anyway; they were
robbing criminals or "lowlife," they were not law-abiding citizens; and they
were displacing crime from their precinct. 190
Some observers found a reassuring aspect in the 77th Precinct scandal:
Through the use of the Internal Affairs Department, the city police responded
181. Id.
182. L. SHERMAN, supra note 21, at xxix.
183. Farber, Decade After Knapp Inquiry, A Sense of Revolution Pervades Police Force, N.Y. Times, Nov.
29, 1982, at Bl, col. 1. "But as a'widespread and organized thing, as something that was once
accepted, that's gone. The whole climate of the department has been reversed since Knapp." Id.
184. M. PUNCH, supra note 21, at 28.
185. See R. DALEY, supra note 144.
186. Police Corruption: A Look at History, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1986, at 84, col. 5.
187. Purdum, 12 from Brooklyn Precinct Arraigned on Broad Range of Charges, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,
1986, at 15, col. 2.
188. Purdum, Officer Admits Guilt in Sale of Cocaine, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at B 1, col. 6.
189. M. McALARv, supra note 4; Drug Influx a Strain on the Best, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 196, at BI, col.
1.
190. M. McALARY, supra note 4, at 171.
Page 201: Winter 1988]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
well to the investigation of the charges of corruption. 9 1 One immediate
response from the Police Commissioner was frequent reassignment of patrol
officers to prevent entrenchment of corruptive practices and influences. 192 In
response, the PBA encouraged work slowdown which demonstrated the rank
and file's resistance to the Commissioner's plan. 193 The slowdown caused the
Commissioner to delay his plan.' 94 Some hoped the scandal would direct
police attention to itself and would result in better policing and better
police/community relations. 95
According to the 1987 Zucotti Report, 96 New York was also suffering
from a severe supervisory crisis. This crisis was caused by several factors:
"long-term vacancies for the position of sergeant, the inexperience of many
new supervisors, the absence of an effective system of performance
evaluation, inadequate training and the distinct supervisory needs of a young
police force."' 197 The report concluded:
The net result has been a tendency to move authority and responsibility upward within
the ranks, thereby diminishing the stature of the sergeant as a key actor at the first line
of supervision. A companion result is that less responsibility and accountability is
delegated to those whose like supervision is essential for the prevention of
misconduct. 198
Furthermore, the panel found that the NYPD lacked an effective program of
field in-service to reinforce what was initially learned at the Academy. 199
As what may be the most studied American police department, the NYPD's
recent corruption episodes echo the concern that illegal drug use and sales in
the 1980's pose new and more serious temptations for corruption.
Corruption issues will remain a salient topic of contention in the more general
discussion of management relations and policing strategies.
V
BOSTON
Boston, like the other four cities described at length in this article, is not a
stranger to municipal corruption. Professor Herman Goldstein, responding
to reports of a recent Boston police scandal, noted that " '[c]orruption has
191. The Cops Caught the Crooked Cops, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1986, at A34, col. I (editorial). One of
the more controversial issues involved in the 77th Precinct scandal was the use of some police
officers to wear recording devices, or "wires" on their bodies, or otherwise provide testimony against
their fellow officers, thus piercing the traditional "blue wall" of police silence and solidarity amid
investigation of corruption charges. See M. McALARY, supra note 4, at 230-51; see also Purdum, supra
note 187.
192. Boorstin, Ward, Defending Transfers, Calls Some Officers "Bandits, " N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1986, at
BI, col. 2.
193. Purdum, Anti-corruption Moves Set Off Slowdown by Police, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1986, at 14, col.
3.
194. Purdum, Ward Agrees to Delay His Precinct Transfer Plan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
195. Smothers, In Drug-Wracked 77th Precinct, Police Suspensions Draw Varied Reactions, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 25, 1986, at B4, col. 1.
196. 2 MAYOR'S ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 153, at 7.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 7-8.
199. Id. at 84.
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been part of the culture in Boston for a long time .... It's more accurate to
view these things as the ebb and flow of officialdom's willingness' to
investigate corruption." 200 In recent years, however, the trial of Boston mob
boss, Geraldo Angiullo, brought the issue to public attention. During the
trial, willful police blindness to illegal gambling and loansharking operations
associated with Angiullo's organization was uncovered.20 ' The scandal was
the most serious since 1976, when the Special Investigations Unit charged
that the Department was rife with corruption and incompetence. 20 2
In Boston, one complication when dealing with police corruption is that
Boston police officers are official agents of the Boston Licensing Board and
possess power to inspect bars for compliance with liquor regulations. 20 3
Thus, another key element in the Angiullo scandal was the existence of off-
duty police detail programs which permitted police officers to work after-
hours in privately owned businesses, including such licensable facilities as
bars or restaurants. 20 4 After a noted shakedown episode caused publicity in
the mid-1970's, 205 Police Commissioner Robert J. diGrazia prohibited the off-
duty details, but they slowly reemerged through restaurants and grocery
stores. 20 6 Still, some changes have been made to limit the temptation for
informal or illegal agreements. While the Boston Police Department does not
keep track of which police officers work off-duty details or how often they do
so, the officers are at least now paid by check instead of by cash, as was the
case in the past. 20 7 Accusations of harassment and vigilante activity by
members of the Boston Police Department were made.20 8
In Boston, three theories of the origins of the recent complaints regarding
police corruption have emerged. One maintains that the owner of a gay bar
took the tale of police shakedowns to the FBI after he grew tired of paying off
police officers. 20 9 Another version has the FBI, working from similar
information, using implicated police officers to collect evidence by placing
body wires on them to record conversations with confederates. 21 0 A third
version holds that a rising number of complaints led ranking Boston police
officers to engage in greater departmental investigation efforts. 2 1'
200. Larmer, Indictments Rock Bay State Police, The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 1, 1986, at 3,
col. 4.
201. Merry, Simmering Boston Police-Corruption Changes Boil Over Again, The Christian Science
Monitor, Oct. 27, 1986, at 5, col. 1.
202. Birtwell, Another Shot at Hub Police, Boston Herald, Oct. 23, 1986, at 7, col. 1.
203. Alters & Paz-Martinez, Charges Leveled of Illegal Payoffs to Boston Police, Boston Globe, Dec. 21,
1986, at 33, col. 1.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Birtwell, supra note 202.
209. Paz-Martinez, Many Theories on Cause for Payoff Probe, Boston Globe, Dec. 21, 1986, at 53, col.
1.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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In October 1986, a pair of top-ranking federal officials appeared with
Police Commissioner Francis M. Roache to announce that a grand jury was
hearing evidence about allegations of widespread corruption in the Boston
Police Department.21 2 The investigation, which had been going on for five
years, focused on patterns of corruption involving top administrators, not just
rank and file officers. 2 13
Certain district stations were targeted as centers of police misconduct, in
particular involving protecting criminal activities at bars and other licensed
premises in return for cash and favors. 2 14 The General Investigations Units
and the district stations of Dorchester, Roxbury, West Roxbury, and
Downtown began to be investigated. 2 15  Investigators were trying to
determine if officers on paid details at private clubs took payoffs and
intercepted violation reports so that no punitive action was taken against the
license holder.
Records on personnel, paid detail assignments, licensed premise
inspections, and incident reports of criminal violations at licensed premises,
some dating back ten years, were seized from the four district stations.2 16 The
grand jury also subpoenaed voluminous records at two city hall agencies that
oversee liquor and entertainment licenses.2 17 Records of the Mayor's office of
Consumer and Licensing Affairs, which regulates entertainment permits for
such things as peepshows, jukeboxes, and video games, were subpoenaed as
well. 2 18
Boston Police Commissioner Roache and Mayor Flynn have been
cooperating with the investigation fully. Flynn said, "They made it very clear
to me that very serious problems with corruption existed in the Boston Police
Department. We have participated fully in an intensive investigation. You
will begin to see the results in the coming weeks and months." 2 19 Roache
pledged his full support to the investigation after being told of its purpose,
"regardless of wherever and to whomever the investigation may lead." 22 0
Former Commissioner Joseph Jordan (Commissioner, 1976-1985), however,
was never told about the investigation even though the probe was underway
during his time in office. 22 1 Jordan was indirectly linked to the alleged
payment of bribes to more than fifty city officers for overlooking under-the-
counter sales of illegal drugs. 222 Jordan denied the accusation.
212. Cullen & Connolly, Records Seized in Probe of Hub Police, Boston Globe, Oct. 23, 1986, at 1, col.
6.
213. Id.
214. Fehrnstrom, Murphy & Mooney, Massive Fed Probe of Police, Boston Herald, Oct. 23, 1986, at
1, col. 2.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Cullen & Connolly, supra note 212.
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Instances of police corruption uncovered in Boston involve many illegal
activities. Charges of illegal shakedowns, bribes, drug trading, vice
operations, and harassment have cast the greatest blow to the morale and
reputation of the Boston Police Department. For example, in the fall of 1986,
convicted copshooter and drug dealer Jesse Waters became a federal witness
in exchange for protection by federal prosecutors. 223 Another recent string of
allegations involved Boston police officers taking bribes for overlooking
violations of liquor license laws at bars. 2 24 Several bar owners describe
situations where officers threatened to cite bar owners for liquor license
violations if they did not pay off the officer.225
One bar owner explained, "[slimply put, if you owned a bar in Boston,
sooner or later you paid someone for protection.- 226 Special circumstances
would exacerbate this arrangement. If someone was caught with drugs on the
bar's premises, the threat to a bar's license could be significant. The most
vulnerable bars were gay bars. 2 2 7 One former club owner informed the Boston
Globe that he did not believe that gay establishments were approached because
they might violate the laws, but because owners of gay clubs are forced to pay
just to stay in operation. 228 Rumors even maintained that some liquor
licenses in the city were owned by city police. 229 Eventually, seven Boston
police officers were indicted under the RICO statute for obtaining kickbacks
from Boston restaurants and nightclubs. 230
VI
SAN FRANCISCO
The city of San Francisco has weathered decades of political conflict
resulting from the diversity of the city's population, no more so than in recent
years when Bohemians, hippies, commune members, activist groups, gay and
lesbian communities, and various influxes of immigrants have made San
223. Waters was the star witness in the case against Boston Police detective George Vest, who was
convicted on two counts of perjury when he denied receiving cash from Waters in return for allowing
Waters to sell marijuana over-the-counter at his Roxbury variety store. Vest was convicted of lying to
a federal grand jury. In the second count, Vest was convicted of lying when he denied acting as the
middleman in a bribery scheme to fix a court case. Waters testified he paid bribes to more than 50
police officers, including former Commissioner Jordan, to protect his drug dealing business. All
those named by Waters denied receiving any payoffs. Vest testified that he paid 10% of his $18,000-
a-week income from his stores to police officers in bribes for protection. He said he gave the money
out in brown paper bags. Besides protection, Waters said police provided him with advance
information about raids and told him when his store would be under surveillance. Doherty, supra
note 5.
224. Criminal Indictment in U.S. v. Boylan, No. A.87-345 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 1987); 7 Indicted in
Case on Boston Police, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1987, at A28, col. 4.
225. Cullen & Malone, Kickback Probe is Widespread, Boston Globe, Oct. 24, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
226. Paz-Martinez, Ex-bar Owner: Police Solicited $500 "Tip, " Boston Globe, Dec. 21, 1986, at 54,
col. 4.
227. Alters & Paz-Martinez, supra note 203.
228. Id.
229. Paz-Martinez, 700-900 Hub Liquor Citations Issued Yearly, Boston Globe, Dec. 21, 1986, at 53,
col. 1.
230. See Indictment, supra note 224.
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Francisco a unique melting pot. The drug culture of the 19 60's and the
gambling dens of Chinatown have grown along with the prostitution in the
hotel district in this most Eastern of West Coast cities. Since police are
conservative and dominated by an Irish-American tradition, they have been
thrown into even more conflict with the diverse lifestyles and groups. The
1978 assassination of a liberal mayor and gay city/county supervisor showed
the cleavages, some vice-related, existing below the cheerful facade of a
popular tourist destination. 23 1
After a police recruit graduation dinner in 1985, a bashful recruit was
handcuffed to a chair, where a prostitute was brought in to perform oral sex
on him.23 2 Of the many officers present, several of whom were recruits, not
one person reported the Rathskellar incident. 233 The internal investigation of
that incident was hampered by the traditional code of silence. Chief
Cornelius Murphy recommended harsh penalties for all of the officers
involved and circulated a code of ethics paper.2 34  Eventually, he
recommended the firing of two recruits, two veterans, and two sergeants. 23 5
As a result of that incident and a series of others, ten of twenty-one captains
were reassigned to new divisions. 236
The number of reports of police brutality had increased, 23 7 and three San
Francisco police officers were tried and cleared of charges that they
kidnapped and beat a local Chinese gang member.238 The rate of complaints
exceeded that of the more drug-plagued city of Oakland and the much larger
city of Los Angeles, prompting concern by Mayor Dianne Feinstein. 23 9 In
response to the mayor's questioning, the deputy police chief claimed that the
difference reflected the different reporting methods among cities and San
Francisco's willingness to process complaints. 240 He also pointed to the job
maturity issue, noting that, as in New York, 50 percent of San Francisco's
officers had less than five years experience.24 l Chief Murphy pointed to the
youthfulness of the police force, noting that they lacked discipline and military
experience. 242
231. W. HINCKLE, GAYSLAYER (1985); F. FITZGERALD, CITIES ON A HILL: A JOURNEY THROUGH
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURES (1986).
232. Chung & Magagnini, Sex Probe Must Allow Legal Counsel for Cops, San Francisco Chron., May 5,
1984, at 1, col. 2.
233. Hughes, Chief Orders Ethics Talks for Police, San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chron., June
10, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
234. Id.
235. Chung & Leary, Murphy Livid, San Francisco Chron., May 3, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
236. Officers Reassigned in Coast Police Scandal, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, at 31, col. 1.
237. Wallace, Big Rise in Complaints Against Police in S.F., San Francisco Chron., May 25, 1984, at 1,
col. 6.
238. San Francisco Chron., July 24, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
239. Wallace, Feinstein Calls for Meeting on Police Dept., San Francisco Chron., May 25, 1984, at 1,
col. 1.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Wallace, supra note 237.
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While the officers were technically better than their predecessors, Murphy
noted that they lacked street sense.2 43 Murphy developed a two-tiered system
of intervention to deal with corruption which included the addition of
situational ethics problem-solving courses in the academy curriculum and
participation by officers in peer group sessions on ethics. 244 Department-
wide, day-to-day accountability and a drive to strengthen the chain of
command within the department were introduced. 245
A San Francisco Police spokesman has explained that the San Francisco
system, in which nine district stations cover the city/county, has been the basis
for a form of team policing, though it is not pure team policing. 246 Every
police officer has a personnel evaluation program folder, which is retained at
the workplace and maintained by a sergeant in charge. 247 Weekly reviews of
each officer are held, and praise, as well as counsel, is used to indicate the
department's evaluation of the officer. According to the San Francisco Police
Department (SFPD), this has been a very promising intervention.2 48 In effect,
the system provides immediate supervisors for everyone, at low expense. All
new sergeants are instructed in the supervisory system, and over time existing
sergeants will be instructed. Two changes have been made in the police
academy and training routines. 249 At the academy, a two-hour class on ethics
and professionalism is taught in the first week. San Francisco has gone
beyond the state standards dictated by the Police Officers Standards Training
(POST) system ant mandated more hours of ongoing education and training.
SFPD has soughto provide an example by sanctioning officers at the top of
the system, as well as at lower levels. 2 50 The city has enhanced its field
training officer system, in the belief that more officers learn from the peer
group level than from teachers. 25 ' One police lieutenant, however, indicated
that the problems evidenced by the Rathskellar recruit incident would not be
cured by these measures and mandated a different supervisory posture. 2 52
On another front of the vice effort, the gay-bashing issue has led to several
changes in the way in which the Department approaches that visible and
politically active minority community.2 5 3  At various stations, ongoing
community relations have been furthered by police bringing in local gay and
lesbian community leaders for "gripe sessions," which have been very
valuable in reducing the distance between the police and the policed. 2 54 At
the same time, the community relations department employs an openly gay
243. Hughes, supra note 233.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Interview with David Ambrose, supra note 6.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Interview with Lieutenant Dan Carlson, San Francisco Police Department (Apr. 10, 1987).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Hinckle, Cop Makes it Safer for Gays, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 1, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
254. Interview with Dan Carlson, supra note 250.
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officer as a liaison to the gay and lesbian community. At the Police Academy,
sensitivity training has been introduced. One week is spent discussing the
minority communities in the city. One day is scheduled each for blacks,
Asians, and gays, a seemingly brief time but an improvement over prior
efforts. While some problems are encountered when policing the rougher gay
bars in the city, the police department has made strides since the riots caused
by the relatively light sentence that was handed to former supervisor and
police officer Dan White, the killer of the liberal mayor and gay supervisor.2 55
VII
CONCLUSION
For many years, criminologists have identified a host of factors which
generate or maintain corruption, as well as defining possible bases for legal
and institutional mechanisms to prevent, discover, or punish such
corruption. 256 Changes in American approaches to vice in the last decade
have altered the parameters of police corruption control.
For instance, Goldstein observed, "Corruption thrives best in poorly run
organizations where lines of authority are vague and supervision is
minimal." 257 Kornblum identified several obstacles to compliance which
included lack of knowledge of how to change existing attitudes, insufficient
time to do so, competing external incentives, and conflicting organizational
goals. 2 58  To Sherman, three elements of internal administration are
important in controlling corruption: increased internal accountability as led
by an active and committed chief, the strengthening of front-line supervision
over both the work time and work products of subordinates, and the
implementation of a program of positive discipline which rewards integrity
and abolishes those formal procedures which inadvertently encourage
corruption. 259 While informal procedures such as interdepartmental transfers
are used more often than formal procedures, Punch explains that internal
disciplinary procedures are slow, cumbersome, inadequately staffed, and are
"hindered by the perceived illegitimacy of a vast array of petty and out-of-date
discipline regulations. '" 2 60
Whereas anti-corruption measures must be realistic, manageable, and
continually reinforced to be successful, the importance of civilian review is
questionable. 261 Experience in several cities indicates that civilian review is
less likely than police internal review to find officers guilty of misconduct and
is more lenient in its' disciplinary recommendations when it does find officers
255. Id.
256. See generally L. SHERMAN, supra note 21; M. PUNCH, supra note 21.
257. H. GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 210 (1977).
258. A. KORNBLUM, supra note 21, at 5.
259. L. SHERMAN, supra note 21, at 120-34.
260. M. PUNCH, supra note 21, at 198.
261. 2 MAYOR'S ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 153.
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guilty.2 62 Others argue that in instances where police themselves gather,
assemble, present, interpret, and then judge the facts related to misconduct
complaints, few serious complaints are likely to be sustained.263 In contrast,
Goldstein points out that no civilian board can exert the kinds of immediate
and day-to-day influences on officers' street performance that are traditionally
the responsibilities of the chief.264 In fact, close supervision seems to have a
negative, rather than a positive, effect on policing. 265 Increasing the number
of supervisors relative to patrol officers, without making other changes, may
be very costly and of little significance.
Consequently, police organizations which wish to reduce incidents of
corruption in the face of a constant level of vice face several dilemmas. First, a
longstanding debate exists between those who advocate further
decriminalization of vice, even legalization in some instances,2 66 and others
who believe that the disorder caused by tolerance of vice can lead to the
furthering of more serious crime. 267 Second, the issue of centralizing vice
patrol responsibility as opposed to decentralizing it continues to cause
debate, and proponents of either side can cite information supporting the
reasonableness of embracing either approach. 268 Similarly, a third issue,
which might be termed a specialist versus generalist debate, parallels a
disagreement on that theme regarding policing as a whole. 269 Namely, are
police who specialize in vice control more effective or efficient, independent
of their corruptability, than police who encounter vice as one item in the
course of their enforcement duties? The fourth issue is the conflict between
autonomy and supervision. 270 This is particularly meaningful when the topic
of community policing arises and beat integrity conflicts with the rotation of
police personnel to prevent entrenchment of corruption.
The problems of drug use and drug-related police corruption have grown
since the time when the Knapp Commission could identify drug-related
corruption as "dirty" graft.27 1 The crack phenomenon, however shortlived or
exaggerated, has brought police in certain cities into more contact with street
sales of cocaine, at the same time as cocaine use has spread throughout
middle-class society. New York police officials now identify use of drugs by
police as their foremost corruption problem rather than other misconduct
262. See generally Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
515 (1971) (studies of New York City and Philadelphia).
263. Schwartz, Reaching Systemic Police Abuses-The Need for Civilian Investigation of Misconduct: A
Response to Wayne Kerstetter, in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY 187 (W.
Geller ed. 1985).
264. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 257, at 174.
265. Kerstetter, Who Disciplines the Police? Who Should?, in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, supra
note 263, at 149.
266. See generally E. SCHUR, supra note 19; Kadish, supra note 38; F. ALLEN, supra note 39.
267. See generally Wilson & Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March, 1982, at 34.
268. J. SKOLNICK & D. BAYLEY, supra note 20, at 214-29.
269. See, e.g., id. at 121-22.
270. Skolnick, supra note 22, at 1151.
271. THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION, supra note 29, at 91-115.
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associated with the profits from drug-related enterprises.2 72 This has
naturally added a new dimension to the corruption problems related to drugs.
What is the implication of the possibility that a free line of cocaine from a
friend may have replaced the free cup of coffee as the most important
precipitating event on the slippery slope toward corruption?
The official reaction to cocaine use by police officers, certainly reasonable
because of the drug's illegal nature, may have created vulnerabilities to
corruption. By official treatment of cocaine use as a deviant category, police
officials may unintentionally open the door for rationalization of accepting
money from drug dealers. If cocaine use was treated more like alcohol issues,
intermediate steps of corruption may be removed. The lesson of
overdramatizing the marijuana use issue is still fresh in many memories. The
campaign against drugs may cause problems when individual officers use
cocaine on occasion or know others who use it recreationally.
Another illegal drug, heroin, continues to confound anti-corruption
efforts. The success of lower-end heroin market enforcement complicates
matters. Because local police, often young and relatively new on the force,
have more opportunities for selective enforcement and because they have
difficulty in seeing their efforts as equal in importance to making major cases
against large-scale dealers, they may be open to corruptive influence. At the
same time, endemic problems from the use of informants in drug control raise
complicating factors for street police. 2 73
Ironically, some of the corruption revelations may be explained as a result
of a historically specific combination of two cohort-related phenomena: the
willingness to blow the whistle and demand integrity in government and the
problems of certain kinds of drug use opening the way to corrupt careers. A
police officer who is twenty-two years old in 1987 was in first grade when Roe
v. Wade274 was decided and the Watergate break-in took place. He was in the
early years of elementary school when the Democratic party included
marijuana decriminalization in their platform debates. 275
On a more symbolic level, the unwillingness of individual police officers,
or some police departments, to acknowledge the legitimacy of gays and
lesbians, even after the enactment of specifically designed anti-discrimination
ordinances, 276 can cause police to subject gay bars to shakedowns
differentially. In each of the five cities examined, gay rights ordinances have
been offered, gay or AIDS victimization issues have been central, and some
amount of police issues related to gay bars have surfaced.
Gambling, traditionally the quintessential "clean graft," has changed
dramatically in the past decade, as several states have approved lotteries or
272. 2 MAYOR'S ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 153, at 24.
273. J. SKOLNICK, supra note 22, at 1150-51; P. REUTER, supra note 52, at 194-97; see also M.
MOORE, BUY AND BUST 126 (1977).
274. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
275. P. ANDERSON, HIGH IN AMERICA 5 (1981).
276. Meeker, Dombrink & Geis, supra note 50, at 756.
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parimutuel wagering. 277 At the same time, the ambivalence of the public and
of officials to illegal gambling has increased.2 78 Certainly, more research
needs to be done to determine the actual relationship of illegal gambling to
organized crime. Most parties to the debate are generally interested
parties,2 79 and a neutral data base would help inform decisionmaking in that
area. Earlier findings, showing that police perceive the seriousness of illegal
gambling as a product of organized crime's role in it, and that many police
favor the legalization of gambling, are dated. 280 Reuter's data from New York
City, challenging the "Kefauver orthodoxy" of illegal gambling as important
and lucrative for major organized crime groups,2 8' could be extended to
other cities. The President's Commission on Organized Crime 28 2 collected
data from local law enforcement agencies which indicate the continued
allegiance to such an orthodoxy. These data do not aid in any widescale
attempt to embrace legalization as the leading alternative to the current level
of illegal gambling prevention. 283 More research also needs to be done to
examine the competitiveness of state-run gambling with illegal forms. Many
have suggested that legal counterparts cannot effectively compete, because
the illegal forms offer more credit, hours, phones, and wagers. 284
The Wilson and Kelling argument on "broken windows," and the effect of
disorder on crime, challenges policing priorities that are informed by
prosecutorial policies or by citizen response to seriousness measures. 285
Their rationale for giving attention to offenses of relatively low seriousness
because such offenses can encourage more serious crimes offers another
complication in any effort to reduce the ambivalence related to vice. 286
On the control side, deterrence and discovery issues related to preventing
corruption may be effectively separated. Deterrence may limit the
effectiveness of other policing mandates, but may nonetheless be less
expensive than employing full observation, reporting, and discovery
mechanisms. The deployment of the latter may affect morale enough to
encourage cynicism, possibly contributing to receptiveness to corruption.
Some responses that emanate from the rank and file would have greater
weight, but might also be limited by street officers' beliefs that corruption
publicity and control is a political reaction to a media problem. 28 7 Where
corruption is less than systemic but still tacitly condoned through a code of
277. J. ROSECRANCE, GAMBLING WITHOUT GUILT 4-5 (1988).
278. SeeJ. MEEKER &J. DOMBRINK, supra note 53, at 3.
279. Id. at 8.
280. Pratter & Fowler, supra note 53.
281. P. REUTER, supra note 52, at 181-87.
282. J. MEEKER &J. DOMBRINK, supra note 53, at 2.
283. Id. at 96.
284. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 267.
285. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND
JUSTICE 4-5 (Oct. 1983).
286. J. MEEKER &J. DOMBRINK, supra note 53, at 96; see generally Skolnick, supra note 26.
287. M. PUNCH, supra note 21, at 200.
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silence, it may be susceptible to efforts to train and preach against it,
something short of "U]ust say 'No' to corruption opportunities."
The momentum of the government undercover sting operations, like
ABSCAM, after faltering, may have gathered steam in recent years with
municipal corruption investigations in New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia,
and elsewhere, especially after the initiation of the Iran-Contra investigation
and hearings. 288 A phenomenon like the post-Watergate emphasis on
institutional integrity may emerge. To the extent that federal prosecutors, as
outsiders, are able to act more effectively than their local counterparts, they
are likely to be the creators of scandal. They tend towards an overreliance
upon prosecution and its deterrent capacity and are less suited to suggest and
implement institutional reforms. 289
Another federal-local police cooperation issue is relatively new. The issue
is a product of federal regulations which allow for the sharing of forfeited
criminal assets with contributing local police agencies. 290 How much local
partnership efforts in the asset forfeiture area increase local police
participation in drug control efforts of a previously exclusively federal nature
will be instructive in determining whether increase or decrease in corruption
opportunities results. More contact with drug dealers might lead to an
increase in corruption. Conversely, less frustration on the part of local police
with perception of their status as junior actors in the drug wars could decrease
corruption. In addition, more careful oversight by other cooperative federal
agencies could reduce corruption.
Gardiner's "Wincanton" findings remain valuable because they pointed to
the contradiction of high tolerance of illegal activity (gambling) and low
tolerance of police corruption.29 1 In Philadelphia, the survey conducted for
the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force found that the public thought highly
of the police, yet also thought that the police might succumb to corruption
and underenforcement in vice areas.2 92 This response to corruption
revelation is entirely appropriate in a city with a high crime rate, fiscal
problems, and a generally high level of police delivery of services.
An emphasis on reducing corruption might deter effective and preferable
policing of major crimes in a number of ways. It might make police wary of
any contacts with potential informants or witnesses who are involved in vice,
limit the aggressiveness of successful police who are both corruption-prone
and courageous in their other policing efforts,2 93 or make police officers fear
288. G. CAPLAN, ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1983);
PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD, THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT (1987).
289. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy,
65 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1171, 1171-72 (1977).
290. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE OFFICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE
FORFEITURE MANUAL 127-28 (1987).
291. J. GARDINER, supra note 12, at 56.
292. PHILADELPHIA POLICE STUDY TASK FORCE, supra note 79, at 164, 168-71.
293. M. PUNCH, supra note 21, at 204.
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that their partners are field associates, thus reducing trust and exposing both
police and citizens to increased danger.
Field' associates programs have been controversial. Anthony Bouza,
former New York Police Department Commander, has called the field
associates program the " 'most effective tool for controlling a police
department.' ",294 In contrast, Phil Caruso, the President of the New York
Police Department Police Benevolent Association, claims " '[t]his kind of
spying within the ranks is very demoralizing and casts an aura of suspicion on
your brother officer.' . . . You don't know who you can trust and who you
can't trust." 295 Representatives of the Philadelphia Fraternal Order of Police
have complained that officers who are not part of the program might be
unduly ostracized. They also suggested that veterans would assume that any
recruit coming out the academy is a field associate and would treat that recruit
accordingly. " 'It virtually seals the fate of the, rookies. . . . Ninety-five
percent of the rookies who hit the streets will not be field associates .... but
they are all going to get a frosty reception.' -296 According to this view,
rookies, who must normally contend with a potentially hostile or indifferent
environment, could suffer added strain which could lead to poor socialization,
increased danger to police, and less effective policing overall.
Finally, the demands of community-based policing complicate the police
patrol organization which attempts to prevent rootedness of corruption in
individual units or geographical areas. This conflict caused New York Police
Commissioner Ward to back down from plans to rotate police officers on a
regular basis to prevent the entrenchment of corruption. 297
Skolnick's and Bayley's suggestions about the appropriateness of various
forms of policing strategies and their deployment in specific communities
indicate that no conclusions can be easily applied to any of the five cities
mentioned, or any other particular city, for that matter. 298 They believe that
policing will probably be more effective to the extent it relies on a mix of
strategies appropriate to each neighborhood rather than relying on the single
complaint strategy as the primary approach for all neighborhoods. 299
Further, they argue that community police commanders should be given the
authority to conduct informal experiments with different strategies to
determine the optimal fit between the unique characteristics of the community
and the mixture of policing techniques. 300 As community-oriented policing
programs expand, the need for responsiveness among police organizations
becomes a key factor in the ability of contemporary police departments to
294. Hepp, Police Spying on Police: Quiet and Controversial, Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 11, 1986, at
BO 1, col. 2.
295. Id.
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297. See Purdum, supra note 187.
298. J. SKOLNICK & D. BAYLEY, supra note 20, at 210-29.
299. Id.
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accommodate changes in crime, disorder, funding, and policing techniques in
the 1980's.301
In a less instrumental sense, police corruption control represents a range
of strategies aimed at installing professionalism, high morale, and
commitment to innovation in police organizations. As John Kaplan points
out, the very police organizations that may be revealed as corrupt are also
typified by a level of organizational ossification that limits the introduction of
innovative policing strategies and the elevation of officials who are not
protective of the corruption and rigidity of the existing order.30 2 Police-
community relations and citizen respect for police are adversely affected by
police corruption. The events of the past decade have further confounded the
ambivalence surrounding the policing of vice. New situations, new cohort
attitudes, new policing demands, and more decriminalization have muddied
the waters in the vice enforcement area. With this ambivalence of innovative
policing strategies, yet another powerful reason for societal resolution of the
legal treatment of vice has been created.
301. Id.
302. Comments of John Kaplan, Professor of Law, Stanford University, at Law and Contemporay
Problems Symposium on Vice at Duke Law School, Durham, North Carolina (June 5-6, 1987).
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